Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 KABUL 01390 01 OF 02 270853Z ACTION SS-25

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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1559

SECRETSECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 1390/1

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1 TAGS: AF, US, PFOR

SUBJ: CONVERSATION WTIH PRESIDENT DAOUD'S BROTHER AND ADVISOR, MOHAMMAD NAIM, ON AFGHAN-SOVIET AND AFGHAN-U.S. RELATIONS

- 1. MOHAMMAD NAIM, PRESIDENT DAOUD'S BROTHER AND PRINCIPAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR, ASKED ME TO SEE HIM FEBRUARY 26. DURING THE 45-MINUTE CONVERSATION, FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR GENERAL GHAUS WAS ALSO PRESENT. NAIM INDICATED THAT HE WATNED TO DISCUSS WITH ME AFGHAN-SOVIET AND AFGHAN-U.S. RELATIONS. HE ASKED THAT HIS REMARKS, PARTICULARLY ON THE FORMER, BE KEPT IN GREAT CONFIDENCE.
- 2. NAIM SAID THAT THE PRINCIPAL MATTER HE WISHED TO INFORM ME ABOUT WAS HIS JANUARY 6-26 TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION. HE HAD GONE PRIMARILY FOR SOME MEDICAL TREATMENT. BUT DAOUD HAD ALSO INSTRUCTED HIM TO SEE BREZHNEV ON ONE SPECIFIC MATTER. HE HAD TOLD BREZHNEV OF THE EXISTENCE WITHIN AFGHANISTAN OF CERTAIN "CIRCLES" WHICH ARE INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES AND WHICH CLAIM SOVIET SUPPORT. HE ASKED BREZHNEV TO COMMENT ON THIS MATTER. BREZHNEV GAVE HIM A CATEGORIC DENIAL THAT THE SOVIET UCPVN IS INVOLVED IN ANY SUCH SECRET

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PAGE 02 KABUL 01390 01 OF 02 270853Z

ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN. BREZHNEV THEN TURNED THE SUBJECT TO THE SOVIET AID PROGRAM FOR AFGHANISTAN AND OFFERED SUBSTANTIAL NEW ASSISTANCE IN A NUMBER OF FIELDS. NAIM TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS THAT SUBJECT.

3. AT THIS POINT NAIM COMMENTED TO ME THAT THERE IS

CAUSE FOR SKEPTICISM ABOUT BREZHNEV'S DENIAL OF SOVIET-SPONSORED ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN. (COMMENT: SE SHARE NAIM'S SKEPTICISM. NOT ONLY HAS THE SOVIET-ALIGNED PARCHAM PARTY ATTACKED DAOUD'S POLICY OF RAPPROCHEMENT WITH PAKISTAN, BUT THERE HAS BEEN A RECENT INCREASE IN ANTI-REGIME PAMPHLETS WHICH MAY BE PARCHAM IN ORIGIN. END COMMENT) NAIM ALSO COMMENTED TO ME THAT MORE SOVIET AID MEANS MORE SOVIET TECHNICIANS AND MORE SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUBVERSION. HE SAID THAT WHEREAS HE DID NOT PURSUE THE SUBJECT OF SOVIET AID WITH BREZHNEV, THIS MATTER WILL CERTAINLY COME UP DURING PRESIDENT DAOUD'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO MOSCOW. COMMENT: IN TELLING ME ABOUT HIS TALK WITH BREZHNEV, NAIM WAS OF COURSE SETTING THE STAGE FOR WHAT HE SAID LATER ABOUT U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS. END COMMENT.

4. SPEAKING IN GENERAL TERMS ABOUT AFHGAN-SOVIET RELATIONS, NAIM SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN STRONGLY DESIRES IN THE COURSE OF TIME TO RESTRICT SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. THIS. HE SAID, CANNOT BE DONE SUDDENLY BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD BE DANGEROUS FOR AFGHANISTAN. BUT HE CITED, AS WAYS IN WHICH AFGHANISTAN IS RESTRICTING SOVIET INFLUENCE, IMPROVED AFGHAN RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN, THE DISMISSAL OF MOST LEFTISTS FROM THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT AND THE NEW AFGHAN CONSTITUTION WHICH IS A "CONSERVATIVE" DOCUMENT NOT ONLY BECAUSE DEMOCRACY CANNOT BE BROUGH OVERNIGHT TO AFGHANISTAN BUT ALSO BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN A CONSCIOUS EFFORT SECRET

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PAGE 03 KABUL 01390 01 OF 02 270853Z

IN DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION TO LIMIT OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUBVERSIVE GROUPS.

5. NAIM WENT ON TO SAY THAT AFGHANISTN CANNOT RESTRICT SOVIET INFLUENCE WITOUT THE HELP OF THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID THAT AFGHANISTAN NEEDS OUR SUPPORT MORALLY, POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY. IT ALSO NEEDS SUPPORT FROM THE REST OF THE "FREE WORLD" AND HOPES THAT WE CAN PERSUADE OUR FRIENDS TO ASSIST. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO OPPORTUNITY YET FOR HIGHLEVEL CONTACT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION BUT THAT HE WANTED TO CONVEY THIS FUNDAMENTAL NEED OF AFGHANISTAN FOR AMERICAN SUPPORT AS HE HAD DONE LAST JUNE IN WASHINGTON TO THE FORD ADMINISTRATION.

6. IN RESPONSE, I SAID FIRSTLY THAT I HOPE TO SEE PRESIDENT DAOUD IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS TO CONVEY THE THOUGHTS OF OUR NEW ADMINISTRATION ON U.S.-AFGHAN RELATIONS AND ON THE U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN'S REGION OF THE WORLD. SECONDLY, I SAID THAT I COULD NOT BE OPTIMISTIC, GIVEN PRESIDENT CARTER'S AND SECRETARY VANCE'S SCHEDULED COMMITMENTS, THAT HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT COULD BE ARRANGED WITHIN AT LEAST THE NEXT FEW MONTHS BUT THAT I HAD THIS SUBJECT VERY MUCH IN MIND. THIRDLY, I SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG BELIEVED THAT AFGHANISTAN ITSELF IS THE BEST JUDGE OF WHAT MUST BE DONE TO PRESERVE ITS INDEPENDENCE BUT THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS SUPPORTED SUCH EFFORTS DIRECTLY AND THROUGH ITS FRIENDS AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

7. NAIM CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION WITH ONE MORE PLEA FOR OUT UNDERSTANDING OF AFGHANISTAN'S GEOGRAPHIC POSTION AND FOR OUR SUPPORT IN RESTRICTING SOVIET INFLUENCE HERE.

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PAGE 04 KABUL 01390 01 OF 02 270853Z

8. COMMENT: ALL OF THIS IS A FAMILIAR NAIM TUNE. THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT IT IS NOT REAL OR THAT IT DOES NOT REFLECT THE VIEWS OF DAOUD AS WELL. WHILE THE

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PAGE 01 KABUL 01390 02 OF 02 270829Z ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1560

SECRETSECTION 2 OF 2 KABUL 1390/2

EXDIS

ARGUMENTS NAIM USES PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR REQUESTS FOR ALL KINDS OF AMERICAN ASSITANCE, THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE DOES NOT EXIST A DEEPLY-FELT AFGHAN DESIRE FOR OUR SUPPORT. AL FIRST BLUSH,

I SEE NO REASON FOR US TO BE DOING ANYTHING DIFFERENT HERE IN THZMIMMEDIATE FURTURE. I WILL, HOWEVER, REVIEW THE SITUATION AGAIN AFTER MY MEETING WITH DAOUD AND MAKE ANY SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS AT THAT TIME WHICH SEEM TO BE APPROPRIATE. END COMMENT. ELIOT

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TAGS: PFOR, AF, US, UR, (NAIM, MOHAMMAD)

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